THE MARRIAGE VIABILITY REQUIREMENT:
IS IT VIABLE?

Many aliens take advantage of immigration laws giving them
preferred status on the basis of marriage to a U.S. citizen or resident alien. Recent court decisions have rejected attempts by the
INS to require that such marriagesbe viable. This Comment suggests that because the purpose of preferential treatment based on
marriageis to unite the marriedcouple, such treatment should be
limited to those persons whose marriagesare viable. The author
suggests that Congress should give clear authority to the INS to
act in this area while providing safeguards against interference
with privacy rights.
INTRODUCTION

Throughout the Immigration and Nationality Act' (INA) are a
number of sections which grant special status to immigrants who
are members of the families of United States citizens and resident aliens. 2 Congress' purpose in enacting these statutes was to
keep families together.3 However, unlike other family relationships, marital relationships are often only temporary. Recognizing that the preferential treatment accorded spouses of United
States citizens and resident aliens was meant to preserve family
unity, the INS has attempted to place a requirement of viability
on marriages 4 Thus, the Service has taken the position that if the
1. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1976).
2. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1978) (exclusion for immediate relatives); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1151(b) (Supp. II 1978) (immediate relative defined); 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (a) (1) (Supp.
II 1978) (unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens); 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (a) (2)
(1976) (unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(a) (4) (1976) (married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(a) (5) (1976) (brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens); 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (9)
(1976) (spouses and children of preference or nonpreference immigrants).
3. H.R. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 37, 38 (1952).
4. The INS began applying the viability standard based on the premise that
the special preference granted on the basis of marital relationships was solely for
the purpose of uniting the family and therefore the benefits of preference status
should be conferred only where that purpose would be served. See In re Lew, 11 L
& N. Dec. 148 (1965).
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couple does not intend to remain married there is no reason to afford the benefit of statutes aimed at family unification to the alien
spouse. 5
The courts, in recent decisions, have reacted harshly to the viability requirement. 6 The decisions indicate that the investigation
of marriages by the INS cannot properly focus upon the projected
viability of a marriage. 7 Part of the problem in this area is that
the courts are unable to find a statutory basis for a viability requirement. The problem goes deeper.8 Courts are reluctant to
approve the use of a viability requirement that would permit the
INS to conduct searching investigations into the sensitive areas of
a marital relationship. 9 The courts are generally concerned that
such investigations may violate the right to privacy.10 At least
one court was also concerned with the problem of federal interference with family law traditionally governed by the laws of the individual states."
This Comment will examine the Service's use of a viability requirement. The Comment will examine the court decisions that
limit the use of marriage viability and the policies for such limitations. Finally, the Comment proposes that only carefully drafted
legislation that defines and limits the viability requirement can
resolve the problems presented by its use.
BACKGROUND

Marital status significantly affects the ability of an alien to immigrate to or remain in the United States. 12 For entry purposes
immigrants are divided, into two categories-preference and nonpreference.13 The preference immigrants are further divided into
several groups. 14 Spouses of aliens lawfully admitted to the
United States for permanent residence are given second prefer5. Id.; see also In re Sosa, LD. No. 2469 (1976).
6. See Dabaghian v. Civiletti, 607 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1979); Whetstone v. INS,
561 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977); Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1975); Chan v. Bell,
464 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978).
7. See cases cited note 6 supra.
8. In addition to the fact that there is no reference to "viability" in the statutes, recent cases demonstrate the courts' reluctance to find that the INS has any

discretion in deciding whether or not to rescind adjustment of status. See, e.g.,
Dabaghian v. Civiletti, 607 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1979).
9. Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.D.C. 1978).

10. Id.
11. Id. at 131.
12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1976) (exclusion for immediate relatives); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(a) (9) (1976) (spouses of preference or nonpreference immigrants).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976).

14. Id.
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ence status.' 5 In addition to the preference and nonpreference
categories, all of which are subject to numerical limitations, there
are exempt groups. 16 One exempt group includes aliens who have
immediate relative status; spouses of United States citizens are
included in this group.' 7 Similarly, aliens already in the United
States who desire to remain can adjust their status to that of a
permanent resident on the basis of a marriage to a citizen or resident alien.' 8 As a result of preferred or exempt status, thousands
of aliens enter the United States each year using the special status confered upon them by reason of their marriage to a United
States citizen or resident alien.19 In 1978 alone, 78,057 aliens were
permitted entry into the United States because they were married
to United States citizens. 20 An additional 77,747 were granted second preference status because they were married to resident
21
aliens.
Spouses of United States citizens who wish to take advantage
of their immediate relative status, and spouses of resident aliens
who wish to gain preference status must comply with the following procedure. 22 If the alien is abroad the spouse must file a form
1-130 with the INS in the United States. 23 This form may be fied
directly with the United States consul in the country where the
beneficiary will apply for a visa if both parties are in that country
at the time.24 The 1-130 must be supported by documentation
showing a record of the marriage, proof of termination of any
prior marriages of either party, and proof of the United States citizenship or residence status of the petitioning spouse. 25 Upon receiving the petition and documentation the INS will launch an
investigation into the marriage. 26 The INS will similarly investigate applications for adjustment of status, when for example, an
alien in the United States with a nonimmigrant visa marries a citi15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1976).
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1976).
8 U.S.C. § 1151 (Supp. IT 1978).
8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1976).
57 INTERPRETER RELEASES 298 (1980).

20. Id.
21. Id.

22. See generally J. WASSERMAN,

1979).

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. §4.9.
Id.
Id. § 4.10(a).
Id. § 4.10(a) (1).

IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRACTICE

327 (3d ed.

zen or resident alien and petitions for adjustment of status to that
of a resident alien. 27 However, if the INS does not find a problem
in the initial stages, it is not precluded from instigating a subse28
quent investigation should new evidence come to light.
29
The INS investigates various aspects of the marriage. Immigration officials are concerned with whether or not the marriage
met the basic legal requirements of the jurisdiction in which it
was performed. 30 When the petitioner presents documented evidence of the marriage at the time of application, the INS begins
with a general presumption in favor of the legality of the marriage. 31 In most circumstances the INS determines the legality of
a marriage by applying the law of the jurisdiction in which the
marriage was performed. 32 There are, however, a few exceptions,
the most notable being that of proxy marriages, which under the
INA must be consummated before they are recognized for immigration purposes. 33 Additionally, immigration authorities have refused to recognize marriages that were viewed as being against
the public policy of the United States. 34 Thus, the INS refuses to
recognize incestuous or polygamous marriages for immigration
purposes, even though such marriages may be perfectly valid in
the foreign country where performed. 35 In general, the INS refuses to recognize marriages under circumstances in which cohabitation of the parties at the place of their proposed domicile
3
within the United States would incur criminal punishment. 6
MARRIAGE VALIDITY

After finding that the standard legal requirements of a marriage
are fulfilled, the INS determines the "validity" of the marriage for
immigration purposes. 37 The INS first looks to see whether the
marriage was simply a fraudulent marriage performed to circum27. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976).
28. If, for example, the alien and spouse were to divorce within two years following entry based on marital status the burden of proof would shift to the alien
to prove that the marriage was not fraudulent. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1976).
29. See generally S. BLALOCK & M. IVENER, HANDBOOK OF IMMIGRATION LAw 33

(1980).
30. See Gee Chee On v. Brownell, 253 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1958); In re P., 4 L &N.
Dec. 610 (1952).
31. See In re M.D., 2 . &N. Dec. 485 (1949).
32. See Roberts, Marriage-Alien Style, 52 INTERPRETER RELEASES 197, 198

(1975).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35) (1976).
34. See In re Darwish, I.D. No. 2191 (1973).
35. In re H., 9 L & N. Dec. 640 (1962) (polygamous marriage, valid where performed).
36. In re M., 2 L & N. Dec. 465 (1948).
37. See generally C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.140 (1978).
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vent immigration requirements. 3 8 The Service has also developed
a viability factor and has required that the marriage be viable in
order to be valid for preference or exempt status.3 9 The power of
the INS to concern itself with sham marriages is still very much
intact.40 However, the authority of the INS to focus on the viability of the marriage is highly questionable. 41
FraudulentMarriages
In order to clearly understand the problems in the viability
area, viability must be distinguished from fraudulent or sham
marriages. A fraudulent marriage occurs when the parties,
though legally married, have no intention of establishing or continuing a marital relationship. 42 In 1937, Congress, seeking to prevent entry and secure deportation of aliens involved in fraudulent
marriages, passed the so-called "Gigolo" Act.43 The purpose of
the Act was to discourage marriage based solely on the desire to
gain preferential treatment under immigration laws. 44 In the
leading case in this area, Lutwak v. United States,45 the United
States Supreme Court interpreted congressional intent regarding
the fraudulent marriage provisions as follows: "Congress did not
intend to provide aliens with an easy means of circumventing the
quota system by fake marriages in which neither of the parties
ever intended to enter into the marital relationship." 46 Since
Lutwak, the INS has clearly had the power to disapprove petitions for preference or exempt status based on marriages which,
though perfectly legal, are entered into solely for the purpose of
circumventing immigration law. 47 As a result, where an agree-

ment exists between the couples to terminate the marriage or to
separate, or in some other way not to fulfill the marital agreement, the Attorney General has the power to refuse entry,48 to re38. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (19) (1976) (exclusion on the basis of fraud).
39. In re Lew, 11 L & N. Dec. 148 (1965).
40. 57 INTERPRETER RELEASES 280 (1980).
41. Dabaghian v. Civiletti, 607 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1979).
42. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
43. Act of May 14, 1937, ch. 182, § 3, 50 Stat. 165.
44. See E. HARPER, IMMIGRATION LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, (3d ed. 1975) for
a discussion of the history behind the implementation of the "Gigolo" Act.
45. 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
46. Id. at 611.
47. Id.
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(1) (1976).

fuse adjustment of status, 49 to bring deportation proceedings
based on fraudulent entry,0 or to rescind adjustment of status. 5 1
Accordingly, whenever a couple's petition has been approved by
the INS but their marriage has been annulled or terminated
within two years the alien will have the burden of establishing
that the marriage was not fraudulent.52 The statutory language
dealing with fraudulent marriages gives the INS clear authority in
such situations.
Marriage Viability
In contrast to the requirement that a marriage be valid, the requirement of viability was never firmly grounded on statutory authority. 5 3 The INS simply took the position that such a
requirement made sense in light of the congressional purpose of
giving aliens preference on the basis of their marital relationships. 54 The purpose of granting preference to certain aliens was

to unite families. 5 5 This policy was not effected by granting preference status to an alien who was no longer living with his spouse
and was perhaps planning divorce at the time the INS acted on
the petition. Thus, in the 1965 case of In re Lew,56 the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA)affirmed a denial of an application for
adjustment of status to permanent resident by an alien married to
a resident alien when an interlocutory decree of divorce had been
entered. The BIA reasoned that legislative history clearly evidenced a congressional desire to unite families. 5 7 However, because the objective of Congress was the preservation of the
family unit, Congress could only have intended to confer benefits
when a bona fide relationship existed in fact as well as in law.58
In applying the viability requirement to situations in which the
couple has separated, the Service's decision to approve or disapprove a petition has turned on whether or not the partners could
have a reasonable belief that reconciliation was possible.5 9
The viability requirement was first successfully challenged in
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976).

50. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1976).
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1256 (1976).
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1976).
53. The word "viability" is not used in either the statutes defining the Attor-

ney General's power to approve petitions or the statute outlining the Service's deportation power in the event of a marriage not valid under immigration law. See 8
U.S.C. § 1154 (1976); 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1976).

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

In re Lew, 11 I. & N. Dec. 148 (1965).
H.R. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 37, 38 (1952).
11 L & N. Dec. 148 (1965).
Id.
Id.

See

D. UNGAR, THE CHANGING PICTURE OF

IIGRATION LAw (1980).
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the 1975 case of Bark v. INS.60 In Bark, the Service alleged that
the marriage upon which the petitioner sought to gain preferential treatment was a sham marriage, but the only evidence upon
which the INS based this contention seemed to be that the couple
had separated. 61 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it
was error to base the decision solely on the separation.6 2 The
court was concerned with possible constitutional problems raised
by the Service's attempt to dictate how much time a couple must
spend together in order to have a valid marriage.6 3 The court suggested that the INS limit its inquiry to whether or not the couple
intended to establish a life together at the time they were married.64
Subsequent to Bark, cases interpreting various sections of the
INA have held that the Service could not properly use the viability of a marriage as a factor in denying petitions based on a marital relationship.
In the 1977 case of Whetstone v. INS,65 the court refused to allow the INS to deny a petition under section 214(d) of the INA66
solely on the lack of a viable marital relationship. Mrs. Whetstone
had obtained a visa as a nonimmigrant fiancee of a United States
citizen. She subsequently married the citizen within the time required but left him less than thirty days later. More than two
months after the separation, Mrs. Whetstone applied for an adjustment of status to permanent resident. The INS denied the petition and ordered deportation.67 The court of appeals reversed
68
the decision of the immigration judge.
In Whetstone, as in Bark, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the
60. 511 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1975).
61. Id. at 1201.
62. Id. at 1202.
63. Id. at 1201. The court in Bark observed:
The concept of establishing a life as marital partners contains no federal
dictate about the kind of life that the partners may choose to lead. Any
attempt to regulate their life styles, such as prescribing the amount of
time they must spend together, or designating the manner in which either
partner elects to spend his or her time, in the guise of specifying the requirements of a bona fide marriage would raise serious constitutional
questions.
Id.
64. Id. at 1202.
65. 561 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977).

66. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d) (1976).
67. 561 F.2d at 1305.
68. Id. at 1309.

INS should focus on the intent of the parties at the time of marriage and not on whether or not a lasting relationship existed at
the time the INS questioned the validity of the marriage. 69 The
court rejected the argument that the Service had the discretionary power to use viability as a factor in rejecting the petition.7o
Another 1977 case, Chan v. Bell,71 held that the Service could
not use lack of viability in a marriage as a reason to deny an 1-130
visa petition. In Chan, the INS refused to recognize a marriage
that was legal in the state of Tennessee. 72 The Service did not allege that the marriage was fraudulent. Instead, the Service relied
solely on the viability factor to deny the petition. 73 The couple in
Chan had married in January of 1975, after a lengthy courtship.
The wife was a United States citizen, the husband a nonimmigrant student. A month after their marriage, the wife filed a visa
petition for her husband. Six months after the marriage, the
couple separated because of marital difficulties. Based on the
separation and the high probability that the couple would divorce,
the INS denied the petition.74 The couple's appeal to the BIA was
dismissed on the basis of an earlier case which held that a viable
marriage was a prerequisite to the granting of a visa petition.75
The couple then filed an action for judicial review by the district
76
court for the District of Columbia.
The district court objected to the use of a viability factor on two
grounds.77 First, the court could not find any specific statutory
authority allowing the INS to-apply such a requirement. 8 Although the court noted the concern by the INS that the purpose
of granting preferential treatment was the policy of family unification, the court remained critical of the use of a vague concept like
viability not spelled out in the statutes. 79 Second, the court found
that the INS had no authority to establish a concept of a valid
marriage different from those concepts utilized by each of the fifty
states. 80 The INS argued that a national standard of marriage
under immigration law would be preferable to fifty separate state
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
464 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978):
Id. at 127.
Id.

74. Id.
75. Id.

76. Id.
77. Id. at 128-29.
78. Id. at 128. The court noted that 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b) directs the Attorney
General to grant immediate relative status to the spouse of an American citizen
without any reference to marriage viability.
79. 464 F. Supp. at 130.
80. Id. at 131.

[VOL. 18: 89, 1980]

Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

standards. 81 The Service analogized a national marriage standard
to the national standard of adultery for immigration purposes established in the 1975 case of Moon Ho Kim v. INS.82 The court,
however, rejected that argument because of substantial tenth
amendment problems raised by the BIA's attempt to define the
term "spouse" in terms of the viability of the marriage as distinguished from the official marital status defined by the law of the
83
individual states.
In 1979, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the viability
8
requirement in still another setting. In Dabaghianv. Civiletti, 4
Dabaghian, a citizen of Iran, entered the United States as a visitor
in 1967, and later obtained student status. In September, 1971,
Dabaghian married a United States citizen and in October, 1971,
he applied for adjustment of status under section 245 of the INA.85
On January 13, 1972, the petition was granted. There was evidence showing that. he was separated from his wife at that time.
On January 28, 1972, only two weeks after the approval of his petition to adjust status, Dabaghian filed for a divorce which was
granted seven months later. He subsequently remarried an Iranian citizen. In August, 1974 the Attorney General moved to rescind the adjustment of status under section 246 of the INA. The
basis for the motion was that Dabaghian was not eligible for adjusted status at the time it was granted. The Attorney General argued that the marriage, though legally alive, was "factually
dead".86 The immigration judge agreed with the Service's contention and revoked the permanent resident status previously
granted.87 The BIA dismissed Dabaghian's appeal, as did the district court.88 The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed and ordered
Dabaghian's reinstatement as a permanent resident.8 9 The court
81. Id.
82. 514 F.2d 179 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

83. 464 F. Supp. at 131. The court noted that the viability concept is strictly a
creation of the BIA and went on to conclude that whatever might be the power of
Congress, notwithstanding the tenth amendment to the Constitution, to establish
a definition of "spouse" apart from the official definition used by the individual
states, the INS certainly has no such power. The court suggested in footnote 17
that such an enactment would subvert traditional modes of domestic relations law
and would thus raise substantial constitutional problems. Id. at 131 n.17.
84. 607 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1979).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 869.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 871.

cited Bark, Whetstone, and Chan, noting that in each of those
cases the court had rejected any attempt to look beyond the intent of the parties at the time of the marriage. 90
Only one recent case has held that viability may be considered
in making a determination as to the validity of a marriage. In
Menezes v. INS,91 the court held that in cases arising under section 245 of the INA,92 involving an adjustment of status as opposed to the rescission of that status, the viability requirement
may be applied. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Menezes
agreed with the Service that the discretionary authority in section
245 permits the viability requirement to be applied in cases aris93
ing under that provision.
The continued vitality of the marriage viability requirement is
now questionable. The interpretation of the courts has been that
the INS has no discretion to use viability as a factor when dealing
with 1-130 petitions,94 fiancee petitions, 9 5 or rescission of status
under section 246.96 Only in considering adjustment of status
under section 245 has the INS been successful in continuing to
use viability as a factor. 97 The Menezes holding may lead to some
bizarre results. 98 Consider, for example, an alien who is out of the
country and wishes to enter as a resident alien on the basis of
marriage. The alien would file an 1-130 petition and, under Chan,
the Service could not consider the viability of the marriage. 99 On
the other hand, an alien already in the country with, for example,
a nonimmigrant student visa, who married a citizen or resident
alien and then wished to adjust his or her status to permanent
resident would have to proceed under section 245.100 Under section 245, the INS could use viability as a factor in its decision
whether to adjust status.10 The result is that an alien already in
the country and involved in a marriage of questionable viability
would be wise to leave the country and reenter under an 1-130 pe90. Id. at 870.
91. 601 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1979).
92. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976).

93. 601 F.2d at 1032.
94. Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978).
95. Whetstone v. INS, 561 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977).
96. Dabaghian v. Civiletti, 607 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1979).
97. Menezes v. INS, 601 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1979).
98. As noted, Menezes does allow a viability factor to be used in determining
eligibility for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976).
99. See Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978).
100. As a result of the Menezes case, under § 245 of the INA the viability of the
petitioner's marriage could be used as a factor in determining whether or not to
grant status.
101. Menezes v. INS, 601 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1979).
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tition rather than to attempt a section 245 adjustment of status
which the Service could deny based on the marital problems.
THE FUrURE OF THE VIABILTY REQUIREMENT

Judicial rejection of marriage viability as a prerequisite to preferential treatment has severely limited the INS in its efforts to effectuate congressional policy.l0 2 In two 1980 proceedings the BIA
acceded to the developing case law regarding viability. 0 3 In In re
Kondo, the BIA held that the nonviability of a marriage at the
time an adjustment of status is granted under section 245 of the
INA104 cannot be used as a basis for rescission of that status
under section 246.105 The Board's decision followed the Dabaghian case but was specifically limited to cases arising in the Ninth
Circuit. 0

6

In In re McKee, the BIA accepted the decision of the

district court in Chan and adopted the reasoning in that case for
nationwide application. 0 7 The decision in McKee could also have
an effect on whether Kondo will remain limited to the Ninth Circuit. 0 8
CongressionalPossibilities
The case law indicates that the Service's authority to require
marriage viability before granting preferred status is quite limited.109 The courts are concerned about the absence of clear statutory authority for a marriage viability requirement and the
constitutional problems posed by the tenth amendment and the
right to privacy. The right to privacy is especially important because a viability requirement might invite an intrusion into the
most private areas of a marital relationship." 0 Whether Congress
may prescribe a viability requirement depends upon the degree
102. See Dabaghian v. Civiletti, 607 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1979); Whetstone v. INS,
561 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977); Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d (9th Cir. 1975); Chan v. Bell, 464
F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978).
103. In re Kondo, I.D. No. 2781 (1980); In re McKee, I.D. No. 2782 (1980).
104. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976).
105. 8 U.S.C. § 1256 (1976).
106. I.D. No. 2781 at 2 (1980).
107. I.D. No. 2782 at 4 (1980).
108. 57 INTrEPRETER RELEASES 281 (1980).
109. In fact, it appears that the INS is presently limited to using a viability requirement only in exercising its discretionary power under § 245 of the INA. See
Menezes v. INS, 601 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1979).
110. See Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1975); Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125
(DJ).C. 1975).

to which such a requirement would infringe upon both constitutionally protected privacy and those interests of the states protected by the tenth amendment.
The Right to Privacy and Due Process Problems
Since no statutory viability requirement exists courts have not
been faced with the question of whether such a requirement
would violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
However, the courts are clearly concerned that the application of
such a requirement would allow the INS to investigate very personal areas of the marital relationship.",
The courts have focused on the procedures which might be
used by the INS in investigating the viability of a marriage.112
The investigation of marriages by the INS is not new. The INS
regularly examines marriages when aliens seek preference or exempt status based on their marital status."l3 While it is during
these investigations that the issue of viability has arisen, the
thrust of the investigations is normally directed towards ascertaining whether or not the marriage was fraudulent.114
When the INS investigates a marriage it calls the couple in for
an interview." 5 Typically, the interview begins with questions directed to the couple together.11 6 Later, husband and wife are separated and each is questioned individually."17
Questions can concern practically anything; the decor of the
couple's home, what the couple ate for breakfast, even whether or
not the marriage has been consummated."18 The purpose of such
questioning is to determine if the couples are in fact living together in a marital relationship.119 If the investigator finds that
the couple's answers to these questions are suspect, or that one
or both spouses are unable to answer, the investigation is continued to determine whether, in fact, the couple ever intended to establish a marital relationship. 20 This further investigation might
require interviews with neighbors, friends, or family or perhaps
111. See Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.D.C. 1978).

-

112. Id.
113. Interview with Patrick McDermott, trial attorney for the INS in San Diego,

California (August 15, 1980).
114. Id.
115. See NATIONAL LAwYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAw AND DEFENSE § 4.10 (2d

ed. 1979).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See D. DAmLov, RELATIVE VISA PETITIONS 28 (1979).
119. Id. at 20.
120. See NATIONAL LAWYERS GuILD, IMIGRATION LAw AND DEFENSE § 4.10 (2d

ed. 1979).
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even a subpoena of bank records to determine if money had been
paid for the marriage.121 The type of investigation described
above is a source of concern for the courts. In Chan, for example,
the district court outlined some of the problems that could arise if
the INS continued to conduct marriage viability investigations.' 22
The court was particularly concerned that investigations would
involve such matters as sexual compatibility, financial security,
23
family relationships and the emotional attitudes of the spouses.1
Chan noted that these are areas which are avoided by even the
124
boldest governmental agencies.
The concern for privacy problems expressed by the district
court in Chan seems reasonable. An analysis of privacy cases,
however, suggests that a viability requirement would not necessarily violate the constitutional right to privacy. Further, it is difficult to understand why an investigation into a marriage's viability
should be off limits when the very similar investigation of a fraudulent marriage is permissible.
The court in Chan cited Griswold v. Connecticut125 and Roe v.
Wade126 as authority for the kind of privacy problems which
might be raised by a viability statute. Griswold and its progeny
involved governmental intrusions into decisions regarding marriage and child bearing.127 In Griswold, appellants were arrested
for giving information, instructions, and medical advice regarding
contraception to married persons. The statute under which they
were prosecuted provided that the use or assistance in using any
contraceptive device was a crime. The United States Supreme
Court found the statute to be an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.128 Justice Douglas' majority opinion was clearly most concerned with the fact that the statute could be enforced only by
intrusion into areas of protected freedoms.129 Part of the concern
of courts dealing with the viability question has been that enforcement of such a statute might require similar intrusion into
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978).
Id. at 130 n.13.
Id. at 130.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
381 U.S. at 485.
Id.
Id.

protected areas.130 The problem centers around just how evidence regarding viability could be gathered by the Service without intruding on a couple's privacy. But, while the statute in
Griswold could only be enforced by intrusion into intimate areas
of a relationship, a viability test could be narrowed and defined in
such a way as not to intrude into those areas. A statute could be
written defining viability only in terms of the intent of the parties.
Further, appropriate guidelines could be written into the statute
which could narrow the focus of investigation so as to exclude details regarding such matters as sexual compatibility.
The differences between the statute in Griswold and a viability
statute are even more apparent if Griswold is analyzed in light of
subsequent cases in the privacy area. These cases suggest that
the real concern in Griswold was the fact that the statute itself
interfered with a personal decision such as whether or not to have
a family.131 Professor Tribe suggests, in his analysis of Griswold,

that the enforcement of the statute would have been constitutional if the underlying statute itself had no relation to intimate
personal choices. 3 2 Tribe suggests that the problem of enforce3
ment was secondary to the issues raised by the statute itself.13 If
this reasoning is applied to the analysis of a viability statute it becomes clear that since such a statute would in no way interfere
with personal choices regarding childbearing it would really not
present the kind of problem at which Griswold and its progeny
were aimed. 134
130. See Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978). In Chan the court asked:

"How. . . would the service go about collecting evidence on these various subjects? What issues would be tried before the INS hearing officer and upon what
standards?" Id. at 130 n.13.
131. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972). Both cases struck down governmental regulations that interfered with the
personal choice of childbearing.
132. L. TarmE, AMERICAN CONsT~rrroNAL LAw 922 (1978).
133. See Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court,
1979 Sup. CT. REV. 173, 198. Professor Posner, in an analysis of Eisenstadt,makes
the following observation:
The Court in Griswold had at least attempted to relate the right to use
contraceptives to familiar notions of privacy by speculating on the intrusive methods by which a statute banning the use of contraceptives might
be enforced. This ground was unavailable in Baird because the statute
there forbade not the use, but only the distribution of contraceptives. Eisenstadt is thus a pure essay in substantive due process. It unmasks Griswold as based on the idea of sexual liberty rather than privacy.
Id.
134. Both the investigation of fraudulent marriages and the investigation of
marriage viability involve the use of essentially the same type of evidence, i.e.,
whether or not the couple are living together, financial information, relationship
with spouse's family and possibly information from neighbors and friends. The
real difference is that regarding possible fraudulent marriages the information is
used to determine the intent of the parties at the time of their marriage, while in
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Additionally, since procedures used in investigating fraudulent
marriages and those used in investigating marriage viability are
quite similar, it seems logical to conclude that if the fraudulent
marriage statutes are permissible, a viability statute should also
be permissible.
Perhaps the difference in the courts' reactions to these areas is,
in part, tied to the fact that viability has not been statutorily defined so as to enable a precise set of procedural guidelines to be
established. The INS itself has never shaped clear guidelines for
defining viability.135 If Congress strictly defined the incidents of
viability, bona fide established marriages which were simply out
of the ordinary might be construed as nonviable. For example, if
Congress defined viability as determinable by whether or not the
couple were living together, spouses with legitimate career reasons for living apart would find themselves in difficulty. On the
other hand, if Congress were to loosely define viability there
would be the danger of placing an unwarranted amount of discretion in the hands of INS investigators, which is exactly one of the
13 6
problems with which the courts are deeply concerned.
Although these concerns are valid, the possibility of drafting a
statute similar to those dealing with the fraudulent marriage area
should be examined. Congress could narrowly define a marriage
as "viable" if the spouses at the time of the investigation intend to
remain together permanently. Intent could be established in
much the same way as it is established in the fraudulent marriage
cases. Similarly, the possibility of shifting the burden of proof to
the government under the statute and setting up procedural safeguards similar to those applied to fraudulent marriage investigations in Stokes v. United States137 should be explored.
the viability situation the information would be used to determine the spouses' intent to remain married at the time the evidence is presented.

135. In contrast, the fraudulent marriage statutes limit the inquiry to the intent
of the parties at the time of the marriage. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (Supp. II 1978); 8
U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1976).

136. See Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.D.C. 1978).
137. 393 F. Supp. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Stokes the district court recognized that
the INS may indeed violate the rights of those subjected to a marital fraud investigation. Although the court in that case denied a class action suit against the INS,
it did-so because the problem lay not with the statutes attacked but with the regulations adopted by the Attorney General via those statutes. The court noted that
the investigatory means used by the INS raised substantial constitutional ques-

tions. Accordingly, a consent judgement was entered that ordered specific proce-

Would the Tenth Amendment be Prohibitive?
In answering the question of whether or not the tenth amendment would stand as a bar to a congressionally mandated viability
requirement two conflicting policies are apparent. Under the
tenth amendment, various powers are deemed vested with the individual states.138 One of the areas of power most stubbornly reserved to the states is that of domestic relations, a fact which has
clearly been recognized by the federal courts.13 9 On the other
hand, there is the policy of federal supremacy in matters such as
immigration law.140
The Chan court recognized this conflict as presenting a serious
constitutional problem, particularly since no statutory viability requirement exists.141 The Supreme Court has held that in order
for federal law to preempt state family law, the preemption must
either be required by a specific statute or be the clear purpose of
Congress.142 The court in Chan was correct insofar as it noted
that without the support of clear congressional policy or a statute
the INS does not have the power to preempt a state's definition of
a valid marriage. However, where the policy is clear or the statute specific the conflict must be resolved in favor of federal law. 4 3
Since Congress has the power to establish standard requirements
different from those of the state in which the marriage was performed, the tenth amendment would not be violated should Congress see fit to further limit the marriages deemed sufficient for
immigration purposes. 144 If Congress were to establish a requirement of viability and set standards by which viability could be assessed, the statute would be constitutional even if in direct
45
conflict with state domestic relations law.1
dural safeguards in the New York INS district. For the specific procedural
safeguards ordered see 54 INTERPRETER RELEASES 80 (1977).
138. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
139. See Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968).
140. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
141. Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978).
142. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904).
143. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978).
144. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (35) (1976) (for immigration purposes a proxy marriage must be consummated in order to be sufficient).
145. See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980). Adams illustrates this conflict between state and federal power. In Adams, the court examined the Service's refusal to recognize a homosexual marriage performed in the
state of Colorado. The court noted that the state itself did not recognize such' a
marriage. However, the court went on to state that even if the marriage had been
recognized under Colorado law, the INS would still have the authority to refuse to
recognize it for purposes of immigration law. The court noted that while cases
generally hold that the INS will apply the law of the jurisdiction where the marriage is performed, Congress is not compelled to do so and may expressly provide
otherwise in its immigration statutes. Further, the court suggested that if the
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CONCLUSION

There are aliens seeking to immigrate into the United States
who gain immediate relative or second preference status, but who
are not the proper subjects of preferential treatment, because
their marital relationships are tenuous and fall apart before or
soon after their preferred status has been granted. It is inequitable that these people should be given preference over others who
have been waiting, sometimes for years, to enter the United
States.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service's efforts to deal
with this inequity through the application of a viability requirement has been severely curtailed by recent court decisions.146
The courts, through narrow interpretations of the Service's discretionary power have frustrated the Service's attempts to carry out
the purpose of the Immigration and Nationality Act-to give preferential treatment in situations where family unity is a reality.
Thus, the Service is now forced to grant preferential treatment
even to aliens who are separated from their spouses with no intention of reuniting.147
A solution to this problem can only come from legislation that
would clearly give the INS the power to require marriage viability
prior to granting preferential treatment. Under the present statutory and case law certain aliens receive preferential treatment
even though they are not within the class Congress intended to
prefer. However, a viability statute might raise serious constitutional problems. Only a carefully drafted statute that provides for
due process safeguards and sufficiently limits the scope of the viability requirement can avoid constitutional problems while alstate law offends federal public policy, Congress is deemed to have intended federal public policy to prevail. The court concluded that Congress never intended
the word spouses to mean two persons of the same sex. Thus, the marriage was
not recognized and would not have been recognized even if valid under state law.
An analysis of Adams suggests that Congress has the power to preempt a state's
domestic relations law where that law is in direct conflict with congressional mandates in the immigration area.
146. See Dabaghian v. Civiletti, 607 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1979); Whetstone v. INS,
561 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977); Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1975); Chan v. Bell,
464 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978).
147. See In re McKee, LD. No. 2781 (1980); In re Kondo, I.D. No. 2782 (1980).

lowing the INS to fulfill the congressional purpose behind
preferential treatment on the basis of marriage.
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